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Martin Jay, Songs of Experience: Modern American and
European Variations on a Universal Theme. Berkeley:
University of California Press, 2005. 431 pp. (+x) ISBN
0520242726.

Reviewed by Richard J. Bernstein
New School for Social Research
Martin Jay introduces his masterful and ambitious study of the history of the
concept of experience in modern thought by declaring: "'Experience,' it turns
out, is a signifier that unleashes remarkable emotion in many who put special
emphasis on it in their thought" (1). But why entitle the book "Songs of
Experience"? Jay is aware of the apparent conceit in using this title of
William Blake's poem cycle. But he intends it as an act of homage. "The
temptation to borrow Blake's title is irresistible" because it perfectly fits his
project: "[M]y intention is not to provide yet another account of what
'experience' really is or might be, but rather to understand why so many
thinkers have felt compelled to do precisely that. Many, if not all, have done
so with an urgency and intensity that rarely accompanies the attempt to
define or explicate a concept. Theirs has been, I hope to show, as much
'songs' of passion as sober analyses" (1).
When Jay speaks of his experience of writing this book, he draws upon one
of the German words that are translated as
"experience," Erfahrung(frequently contrasted with Erlebnis). Jay notes
that Fahrt (journey) is embedded in Erfahrung, a word that is also linked
with the German word for danger (Gefahr). Jay's journey is filled with
unexpected turns, risks, and dangers. Jay is sensitive to the criticisms that
have been advanced against the appeal to experience by such thinkers as
Richard Rorty and Joan W. Scott. Scott, for example, claims that the belief
that shared experience serves as the ultimate ground of cultural differences
"undermines any attempt to explore the impersonal processes that construct
the subject in the first place" (3). Despite her adamant denial of any
foundational authority to the term, Scott declares that "experience is not a
word we can do without, although given its usage to essentialize identity and
reify the subject, it is tempting to abandon it altogether. But experience is so
much a part of everyday language, so imbricated in our narratives that it
seems futile to argue for its expulsion . . . . Given the ubiquity of the term, it
seems to me more useful to work with it, to analyze its operations and
redefine its meaning" (3-4).
I want to outline Jay's project in order to orient a more detailed discussion of
some of his songs of experience. He begins with a brief survey of the
concept of experience from the Greeks to Montaigne and Bacon. In classical
thought, the concept of experience played a relatively modest role. Jay's
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adventure really begins with Montaigne and Bacon. Montaigne's reflections
on experience may even be said to define one of the poles of modern
discourse about experience. We find affinities between Montaigne and
phenomenologists such as Merleau-Ponty (who greatly admired Montaigne),
hermeneuticians such as Gadamer, and even such pragmatists as James and
Dewey. Montaigne never attempts to define or "manage" experience. Rather
he proceeds by anecdote, illustration, comparison, passing remarks: a
"method" intended to illustrate the untidiness, the diversity, and the transient
character of experience. Experience is filled with paradoxes, ironies, and
disappointments. Montaigne exhibits a remarkable serenity in learning to live
with contingency, uncertainty and ambiguity. But despite Montaigne's
humanistic moderation, he was an "inadequate model for modern man at his
most restless and ambitious . . . . [Modern thinkers] wanted to move into a
world and scrutinize it instead in the hope of finding new and reliable
knowledge that would help master what had hitherto been outside of human
control" (28). Bacon and Descartes exemplified this new spirit. Experience
for them is to be judged insofar as it contributes to or inhibits the
advancement of genuine scientific knowledge. Jay observes that "[t]he
scientific version, based on a transcendental, disembodied, immortal species
subject located more in impartial instruments than fallible bodies, activated
the etymological link . . . between experience and experiment, while
suppressing the value of accumulated wisdom from the past." This sets the
background for the epistemological concern with experience that dominated
the eighteenth century.
Jay traces the central debates about the cognitive understanding of
experience in the works of Locke, Hume and Kant. It is against this
epistemological background (frequently caricatured by subsequent thinkers)
that the other modalities of experience were articulated. Jay then explores the
attempts to characterize moral and religious experience (Schleiermacher,
James, Otto, and Buber). He passes on to art and aesthetic experience ("From
Kant to Dewey"); political experience (Burke, Oakeshott, and the English
Marxists); and historical experience (Dilthey, Collingwood, Scott, and
Ankersmit).
After this exploration of the different specialized modalities of experience,
Jay turns "to attempts made by a wide range of thinkers in the last century to
heal what they lamented in the ruptures of experience and generate or
recover a more holistic alternative, restoring -- at least to a certain extent -the outlook of Montaigne" (39). In the second part of the book, Jay explores
the debate about experience in the American pragmatic tradition (James,
Dewey, and Rorty); the lament about the crisis of experience (Benjamin and
Adorno); and finally, the poststructuralist reconstitution of experience
(Bataille, Barthes, and Foucault).
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The range of these songs of experience is breathtaking. Frequently, where we
would like to pause in order to listen more carefully to nuances and shading,
we are rapidly hurried on to the next cycle. But one can also begin to discern
the dynamic overarching direction of Jay's journey. I would characterize his
project as quasi-Hegelian -- and the qualifying "quasi" is crucial. Unlike
Hegel, Jay disclaims any overall synthetic unity. There is no
grand Aufhebung. Unlike Hegel, Jay does not want to suggest that each
moment or stage in this development is integrated into the next stage.
Nevertheless, we can discern a basic structure that bears a strong affinity to
Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. With Montaigne we discover the outlines
of a holistic conception of experience. Structurally, this is like Hegel's
invocation of the naïve holism of the early Greek Sittlichkeit and culture. We
cannot remain satisfied with this naïve holism. There is a "necessity" to pass
beyond it -- and this passing beyond leads to a process of diremption,
fragmentation, and specialization. We also come to appreciate the onesidedness of the isolated modalities of experience. In the twentieth century, a
variety of thinkers seek "to heal what they lamented as the ruptures of
experience and generate or recover a more holistic alternative . . . (39). (The
very language of "rupture," "healing," and "holism" owes a great deal to
Hegel.) We, the readers, participate in this journey -- as we do with
the Phenomenology of Spirit -- a journey that Hegel calls Erfahrung. Jay,
like Hegel, seeks to bring forth the "truth" that is implicit in the changing
conceptions of experience -- even when they are incompatible with each
other. He enables us to appreciate the insights (and limitations) of thinkers as
they struggle to articulate what they take to be most vital about experience.
In a short review one cannot do justice to the richness of Jay's text, but I do
want to give an example of one of his most illuminating song cycles,
"Politics and Experience." We can see here the perplexities that break out in
any attempt to give a satisfactory account of experience. Jay presents the
challenge thrust in the face of those who appeal to a politics of experience:
"A politics of experience," warns an eminent feminist critic, "is inevitably a
conservative politics." Rather than a check against ideology, adds a
prominent Marxist theorist, experience is "ideology's homeland."
"Experience," observes a third commentator, was routinely elevated above
"analysis" by defenders of "reactionary modernism" in Germany. (170)
In a long tradition dating back to Burke (and even earlier), conservative
thinkers have appealed to the funded wisdom of experience. They have been
suspicious of abstraction, the appeal to universal principles -- and to what is
frequently called "rationalism." But it is also true, as a matter of empirical
fact, that there have been progressive and radical thinkers who have appealed
to a politics of experience. There is another way of interpreting the claim that
a politics of experience is necessarily conservative. Despite the "noble"
intentions of progressive thinkers, the appeal to experience "inadvertently
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produces conservative outcomes" (170). This accusation was made and
debated with intense vehemence by twentieth-century English Marxists.
Jay singles out the conservative thinker Michael Oakeshott, who is famous
for his critique of "rationalism in politics." Rationalism, as he understood it,
favors what is abstract and untested over the concrete wisdom of experience.
Rationalism presents itself as enlightened, but it is politically dangerous: it is
the source of most of the evils in modern and contemporary life. Oakeshott
attacks the tradition that began with Bacon and Descartes because it
instigated the pernicious faith in the "sovereignty of technique." His critique
of "instrumental reason" echoes many of the arguments that we find in the
left thinkers of the Frankfurt School. It also bears a resemblance to
Heidegger's critique of Gestell (Enframing). Ironically, Oakeshott's notion of
experience was given a progressive twist. Employing a concept of
experience similar to Oakeshott's, Raymond Williams and E.P. Thompson
drew upon the radical political experience of the working class. Thompson's
monumental The Making of the English Working Class transformed the
writing of social history into a "history from below" and sought to "recover
the lost experience of those forgotten by history" (196). Jay takes up the
bitter fights that broke out between the "humanist" radical thinkers who
appealed to political experience and the younger more "theoretical"
generation (e.g., Perry Anderson and Terry Eagleton) who were influenced
by the structural Marxism of Althusser. The "humanists" were accused of
being fuzzy-minded "sentimental romantics," lacking analytic finesse and
tough-minded theoretical rigor. They failed to grasp the way in which the
appeal to experience is essentially ideological. Thompson's response was no
less vigorous in its polemical attack on the "poverty of theory." Jay does a
splendid job of summarizing the key moves and counter-moves in this
intense debate. But it would be foolish to think that there was a clear victor
in this battle. Williams and Thompson finally acknowledged some of the
crucial ambiguities in the meaning of experience, and the grand theoretical
claims made in the name of a "scientific" Marxism simply collapsed.
What do we learn from this battle over the politics of experience? First,
appeals to experience -- depending on historical context -- can be used to
"justify" conservative and progressive options. Second, the "truth" implicit in
the claims of the defenders of political experience (whether right or left) is
that one can learn from the collective practical wisdom of accumulated
experience. But there is also a "truth" in the arguments of those who claim
that experience can harbor deep ideological prejudices and distortions that
need to be brought out into the open and subjected to rigorous critique.
Furthermore, we discover something that crops up in any attempt to do
justice to experience: the need to preserve a proper tension between the
subject of experience (the experiencing) and the object of experience (the
experienced). Jay generalizes this point:
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For as we have seen in the cases of cognitive, religious, aesthetic, and
political experience, unless some sort of tension is preserved between the
subject of experience and the object -- whether it be nature, God, things of
beauty, or political goals -- there is a danger of losing precisely the very
encounter with otherness and the moment of passivity that are so deeply
embedded in the concept of experience in most of its guises. (221)
In the second part of the book, Jay considers a variety of thinkers who
attempt to overcome the fragmentation that resulted from the concentration
of specialized modes of experience in order to develop an all-encompassing
notion. He writes, "Hoping to recapture a more robust, intense, and allencompassing notion of experience -- whether it be called 'authentic' or
'essential,' or 'pure' or 'inner' -- they sought to reverse the process of
differentiation. Often betraying a sense of nostalgia for what had purportedly
been lost by modalization, they hoped to make whole, reinvigorating a
common life-world that had relinquished its coherent meaning with the
development of subcultures of expertise" (263). At a very abstract level, one
can see Jay's point. Yet when we turn to the details of his final three
chapters, one seriously wonders whether twentieth-century thinkers have
recaptured "a more robust, intense, and all-encompassing notion of
experience." The best case for making this claim is to be found in the
reconstruction of experience by the American pragmatists.
One of Jay's most significant achievements is his recovery of the importance
of the American pragmatic tradition. Pragmatism has been so badly
caricatured that it is a pleasure to read Jay's insightful discussion. He
understands that the heart of pragmatism is a rethinking and reconstruction
of experience -- one that does full justice to its cognitive, scientific, aesthetic,
religious, political and historical dimensions. Jay discusses the importance of
James for our understanding of religious experience and Dewey's
contribution to a balanced view of aesthetic experience. For Dewey there is a
rhythm that is internal to what he called "having an experience": a rhythm
involving a tension and a conflict that need to be resolved. If it is
successfully resolved, then a new integration and wholeness are achieved.
This consummation is what Dewey identifies as the aesthetic moment in the
rhythm of experience. There is no ultimate finality, only a continuous
dynamic rhythm. Aesthetic experience is not a special type of realm of
experience. Rather it is a distinctive pervasive quality that can characterize
any experience -- including scientific inquiry and practical activity. Dewey
was particularly sensitive to the need to overcome the rigid epistemological
and metaphysical dichotomy between subject and object that has plagued so
much of modern thought. The distinction between what is subjective and
objective arises within experience. Dewey's conception of experience can be
viewed as a naturalized and pluralized version of the Hegelian conception
of Erfahrung. Experience is the transaction of an agent-patient with its
environment. The pragmatists integrate the passive, suffering, undergoing
BRYN MAWR REVIEW OF COMPARATIVE LITERATURE, Volume 5 , Number 2 (Winter 2006)
0

5

Bryn Mawr Review of Comparative Literature, Vol. 5, No. 2 [2018], Art. 3

dimension of experience with its active, experimental aspect. Pathos
(undergoing) and agency are inextricably related. They also maintain the
creative tension between experiencing and the experienced. The pragmatists
integrate the contingent fallible aspects of experience emphasized by
Montaigne and the scientific experimental aspects of experience stressed by
Bacon. They criticize the tendency of "empiricists" to substitute rarified
abstractions for the dynamic pluralistic "muchness" of concrete experience.
At the same time, they take seriously the active, intervening, experimental
character of experience. (Dewey favored the term "experimentalism" as a
description of his philosophical position.) Furthermore, the pragmatists
appreciate the historical shaping of experience as well as its political
dimension. This is evident in the way in which Dewey, for example, sought
to democratize experience.
When we turn to Jay's discussion of Benjamin and Adorno, we seem to be in
an entirely different world. They were preoccupied with the "crisis of
experience": the loss of "real" experience in the modern world. Jay's
discussion of Benjamin is a tour de force. With deftness, subtlety, and
nuance, he succinctly follows the twists and turns of Benjamin's "obsession"
with experience from his earliest writings through the posthumous Arcades
Project. But one may seriously question Jay's claim that Benjamin and
Adorno elaborate an "all-encompassing notion of experience." Despite the
fact that Benjamin kept returning, extending, and critiquing Kant (just as
Adorno did with Hegel), there is scarcely any serious concern with
integrating the cognitive scientific dimensions of experience into their
understanding of the concept. Indeed, it was the presumably promiscuous
development of science and technology that brought about the "crisis of
experience."
In his final song cycle, "The Poststructuralist Reconstitution of Experience,"
Jay does a splendid job of showing that these thinkers do not abandon
experience in favor of the linguistic turn. Rather they seek to reconstruct the
concept of experience without a subject. Bataille speaks of "inner
experience," which we might normally construe as "subjective" experience.
But paradoxically, it means something radically different: "willingness to
live life as a radical experiment, involving the body as well as the mind,
risking danger in the quest for a certain version of redemption" (370).
Bataille is obsessed with extremes: suffering, pain, ecstasy, rapture, and selfimmolation. Foucault takes up Bataille's theme of transgression. But there
are also unresolved tensions between Foucault's flirtation with "limitexperiences" and writing the "history of truth." Foucault succinctly
characterizes his complex project in a late interview:
I have taken pains to understand how man had reduced some of his limitexperiences to objects of knowledge (connaissance): madness, death, and
crime. Here, if you like, the themes of George Bataille may be recognized,
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reconsidered from the point of view (optique) of a collective history, that of
the West and its knowledge (savoir). The relationship between limitexperiences and the history of truth: I am more or less imprisoned or
wrapped up in this tangle of problems. (399)
Jay shows just how central this concept of "experience without a subject" is
for these French thinkers. But his claim that they are engaged in the project
of overcoming the earlier modalization of experience and are seeking a new
holistic conception is unpersuasive. They emphasized very selective and
idiosyncratic aspects of experience. I doubt whether Montaigne would even
have recognized what Bataille and Foucault mean by the term. Their
emphasis on extremes, limits, and transgression is antithetical to the spirit of
his balanced and judicious understanding of the contingency of experience.
I do not know of any other study that seeks to be as comprehensive and as
exhaustive as this one. Jay has a rare ability to treat the most varied ideas
with delicacy and hermeneutical generosity. It is a stunning achievement.
And yet, it is not completely satisfying, in part because of its ambition. Jay
covers too much ground. For all its alleged comprehensiveness, one comes
away with a sense of incompleteness. Many aspects and ways of thinking of
experience are simply not treated here. With few exceptions, Jay does not
deal with the way in which poets, novelists, and artists think about it. Major
figures such as Wittgenstein and Husserl, who have changed the way we
think about it, tend to be marginalized. It is perplexing too why Freud -- and
more generally psychoanalysis, which has transformed our understanding of
experience -- is never thematized. There are limits to what can be covered in
a single book. But the main problem is that Jay's principle of selection -what does and what does not get discussed -- is never entirely clear.
Paradoxically, there is too little history here. In his introduction, Jay tells us
that because his "cast of characters" is so large he cannot make a sustained
attempt to contextualize the origin and development of their ideas. But he
pays a heavy price for this limitation. We do not have much sense of what
historical factors influenced these thinkers. Intellectual historians are
confronted with twin dangers. There is a danger of reductionism, of treating
ideas in an oversimplified and distorted manner and of accounting for them
by appeal to historical variables in a crude manner. This is not a danger that
even tempts Jay. But there is the opposing danger of abstracting ideas from
the thickness of history -- social, political and cultural. Jay is aware of this
danger, but by covering so much ground he has to sacrifice detailed
historical contextualization for conceptual analysis.
I also think that questions may be raised about Jay's developmental tripartite
structure: Montaigne's holism; the modalization and fragmentation of
experience; the development of a more robust holism that overcomes the
modalization of experience. As Jay himself indicates, early in the nineteenth
century, Hegel had a deep sense of the fragmentation of experience, and he
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sought -- in a more ambitious way than any previous thinker did -- to
develop an all-encompassing robust conception of Erfahrung. We find the
yearning for holism concurrent with the modalization of experience. And this
continues right up to the present.
At the beginning of his book Jay declares: "'Experience,' of all the words in
the philosophic vocabulary is the most difficult to manage;' warns Michael
Oakeshott . . . " (9). Jay discovers just how difficult it is to manage
"experience." A skeptical reader might come away with the feeling that
"experience" is not just difficult to manage, but is a signifier that can take on
the most diverse conflicting and contradictory meanings. Perhaps it would be
best if we could drop the term altogether. But there is another moral that can
be drawn from Jay's exciting and perilous journey, the one that I think Jay
wants us to draw (and which I share). Despite the protean quality of
"experience," it has a power, a passionate intensity and a lure that are
irresistible. Like the return of the repressed, experience has the dynamic
power of returning in ever-new guises. We cannot escape from appealing to
experience (in one of its multiple and changing shapes) in our irrepressible
attempts to make sense of our being-in-the-world.
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